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Policy Considerations in the Taxation
of B Reorganizations
By JOHN P. STEINES*

A transaction in which one corporation (the "acquiring corporation") exchanges its stock for stock of another corporation (the "acafter the exchange, the
quired corporation") is a "B" reorganization if,
acquiring corporation is in control of the acquired corporation. ' For
federal income tax purposes, B reorganizations are nontaxable to all
2
parties concerned.

The basic policy underlying this tax-free treatment of corporate

reorganizations is that a change merely in the form of a corporate investment should not be a taxable event. A "mere change in form" is

shorthand for a continuation of business enterprise and shareholder interest. 3 Where these conditions are satisfied, -the tax law is neutral; no
gain or loss is recognized. Tins treatment does not permanently eliminate the tax consequences that would attend an outright sale of the
corporate investment; it merely postpones them. The taxpayer's basis
in the old investment becomes the basis in the new investment. 4 Gain
* Assistant Professor of Law, New York University. B.I.E., General Motors Institute; J.D., 1974, Ohio State University; L.L.M., 1978, New York Umversity. The author
gratefully acknowledges Professor John Teschel's thoughtful criticism of preliminary drafts.
1. A "B" reorganization is defined as "the acquisition by one corporation, m exchange
solely for all or part of its voting stock (or in exchange solely for all or a part of the voting
stock of a corporation which is in control of the acquiring corporation), of stock of another
corporation if, immediately after the acquisition, the acquiring corporation has control of
such other corporation (whether or not such acquiring corporation had control immediately
before the acquisition)." I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B). I.R.C. § 368(c) defines "control" as the
"ownersliip of stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all
other classes of stock of the corporation."
2. "No gain or loss shall be recogmzed if stock or securities in a corporation a party to
a reorganization are, m pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock
or securities in such corporation or m another corporation a party to the reorganization."
.R.C. § 354(a)(1).
"No gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the receipt of money or other
property in exchange for stock (including treasury stock) of such corporation." I.R.C.
! 1032(a).
3. Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947); H.R. REP.No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d
;ess. 16-17 (1934), reprintedin 1939-1 (part 2) C.B. 564.
4. I.R.C. § 358(a)(1).
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or loss inherent in the former is accounted for when the latter is disposed of in a taxable transaction. Thus, the reorganization provisions
accord tax deferral. Although easily stated, this policy can be very elusive.
For many years the view has prevailed that the transfer of any
consideration other than stock of the acquiring corporation, "boot,"
disqualifies the transaction as a B reorganization. That view is premised upon the word "solely" in the definitional section of the Internal
Revenue Code, section 368(a)(1)(B). 5 This requirement, which
originated in the Revenue Act of 1934,6 on its face would appear to
limit B reorganizations to pure stock-for-stock exchanges. The argument that "solely" should be interpreted liberally, so that an otherwise
permissible B reorganization would not be destroyed by the presence of
7
a small amount of boot, had never succeeded.
In Reeves v. Commissioner,8 however, the tax court cast doubt on
the continued vitality of this inveterate principle. The case involved
cash purchases by International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation
(ITT) over a four month period of approximately eight percent of the
stock of Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford), followed fourteen months later by ITT's acquisition of nearly all of Hartford's remaining stock in a stock-for-stock exchange. Four judges joined in the
main opinion holding that the exchange constituted a B reorganization,
two concurred in the result under a separate opinion, and five dissented. Three months later, in Pierson v. United States,9 a refund action involving the same facts, the United States District Court for
Delaware agreed with the result in Reeves and squarely departed from
prior law in holding that the exchange qualified as a B reorganization.10 The government appealed the decision to four circuits of the
court of appeals, two of which reversed the lower courts' determination
as to the construction of "solely," I although, remanding on the issue of
5.
6.

I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B), quoted at note I supra.
Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 12(g)(1)(B), 48 Stat. 705 (codified at I.R.C.

§§ 368(a)(1)(B), (C)).
7.

See, e.g., Howard v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 792 (1955), rev'don othergrounds, 238

F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956).
8. 71 T.C. 727 (1979), rev'dsub nom. Chapman v. Commissioner, 80 U.S. Tax Cas.
1 9330 (1st Cir. 1980).
9. 472 F. Supp. 957 (D. Del. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Heverly v. Commissioner, 80 U.S.
Tax Cas. 1 9332 (3d Cir. 1980).
10. 472 F. Supp. at 975.
11. By stipulation of the parties in Reeves and several companion cases, appeals were
taken to the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits. In a consolidated appeal, both Pierson
and Reeves were reversed by the Third Circuit. Heverly v. Commissioner, 80 U.S. Tax Cas.
9322 (3d Cir. 1980). The First Circuit also reversed the tax court in Reeves. Chapman v.
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whether ITT's cash purchases of Hartford stock were part of a plan of
reorganization. Unless the remaining appeals are disposed of similarly
by the circuit courts, Supreme Court review seems likely; even then the

importance of the issue to the administration of federal tax law may
12
warrant certiorari.
This Article is not confined to the narrow issue, decided in Reeves
and Pierson, of how to interpret "solely." It is equally concerned with
a number of related issues that continue to cloud the treatment of B
reorganizations. Reeves and Pierson, however, do provide a convenient
factual backdrop for discussion. The Article considers the meaning of

the statutory language a "plan of reorganization," the proper role of the
step transaction doctrine, the definition of "solely," "creeping" acquisitions, and legislative reform addressed to confusion caused by each.
These subjects are discussed under the direct influence of the policy

behind the tax-free treatment of reorganizations, a policy which, as the
government's position in Reeves and Pierson demonstrates, too often is

lost in the labyrinth of detail that has marked the developing treatment
of corporate reorganizations. Only a modest attempt is made to reconcile the remarks herein with possibly conflicting notions expressed in

the thicket of cases and rulings dealing with other types of reorganizations.' 3 A fresh look at the fundamental requirements of a B reorganization, and the reasons for them, is more useful.
Facts and Background of Reeves and Pierson
The transactions culminating in the Reeves and Pierson litigation

began in October, 1978, when a representative of ITT approached
Hartford's investment banker to suggest the possibility of a merger.
Hartford rejected the overture. At about the same time, ITT learned

that a six percent block of Hartford stock was available for purchase
from a third party. In November, ITT advised Hartford of its interest
in acquiring that block, but assured it that ITT would not attempt a
Commissioner, 80 U.S. Tax Cas. 9330 (Ist Cir. 1980). Appeals are pending in the two
remaining circuits. Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 727 (1979), appealdocketed, No. 791438 (4th Cir. May 4, 1979); No. 79-728 (9th Cir. May 4, 1979). With respect to the issue of
the scope of the plan of reorganization, see notes 26-67 & accompanying text infra.
12. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 283-84 (1960).
13. Reconciling the B reorganization cases alone is difficult enough. Consider this passage from Vernava, The Howardand Turnbow Casesand the "Solely" Requirement ofB Reorganizations, 20 TAx L. REv. 387, 420 (1965): "It seems, therefore, that Howard and
Turnbow can be distinguished and allowed to stand together. Any attempt to distinguish the
cases, however, disregards their basically conflicting views on the place of the boot provisions, and on the effect of those provisions in any attempted reorganization." Such talk
makes one question the utility of intricate analogy in this area.
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hostile takeover. Given that assurance, Hartford did not object to the
purchase but reiterated that it had no interest in merging with ITT.
Hartford stated that it was considering diversification on its own, but
would not take steps that would foreclose a future affiliation with ITT.
ITT purchased the six percent block for cash in November.14
On December 23, 1968, ITT submitted a written proposal of
merger to Hartford. 15 After investigating the proposal, Hartford rejected it and on February 28, 1969, suggested a merger on terms more
favorable to its stockholders. ITT made numerous additional cash
purchases of Hartford stock, in the meantime, increasing its ownership
of Hartford to approximately eight percent by March 13, 1969. Hartford's proposal' 6 was accepted by ITT and executed on April 19, 1969.
The proposal, which remained subject to approval by stockholders of
both companies and the Connecticut Insurance Commissioner, gave
Hartford the right to withdraw should a probability of antitrust litigation arise.17
In June, 1969, the Department of Justice announced plans to stop
the merger. Notwithstanding that threat, Hartford recommended that
its stockholders approve the merger. The Department of Justice then
moved for an injunction, which was denied in October. 18 On October
13, 1969, the Internal Revenue Service issued a private ruling stating
that the proposed merger would qualify as a B reorganization if ITT
disposed of the stock it acquired for cash before the Hartford stockholders voted on the proposal. 19 Shortly thereafter the Service issued a
supplemental ruling approving the sale of such stock to Mediobanca,
20
an Italian bank.
14.

Pierson v. United States, 472 F. Supp. at 958-59; Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.

at 728-29.

15.

ITT's proposal entailed an exchange of ITT stock for Hartford stock, but the pre-

cise form of the exchange was left uncertain, the proposal stating only that ITT expected that

Hartford would continue as a separate entity. Affidavits in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Pierson v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 957 (D. Del. 1979), rev'dsub
nom. Heverly v. Commissioner, 80 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9322 (3d Cir. 1980).
16. This proposal took the form of a reverse triangular merger, of the type described in
I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E), although that section did not take effect until 1971. The plan called
for a newly formed subsidiary of ITT to be merged into Hartford, with the Hartford stock-

holders exchanging their stock for ITT stock, thereby making Hartford a wholly owned
subsidiary of ITT. See Rev. Rul. 67-448, 1967-2 C.B. 144 (treating such a merger as a B

reorganization).
17. Pierson v. United States, 472 F. Supp. at 959; Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at
729-30.

18.

Pierson v. United States, 472 F. Supp. at 959; Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at

730.

19.
20.

Pierson v. United States, 472 .F. Supp. at 959.
Id The purpose of this disposition was to "purge" ITT of Hartford stock acquired
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The ITT stockholders approved the merger in June, followed by
the approval of the Hartford stockholders did the same in November.
In December, however, the Connecticut Insurance Commissioner refused his approval, primarily because the proposed merger forced dissenting Hartford stockholders either to participate in the exchange or
exercise their appraisal rights. ITT then proposed to offer its stock on
substantially the same terms directly to the Hartford stockholders on a
voluntary basis. The Connecticut Insurance Commissioner approved
this exchange offer on May 23, 1970, and three days later ITT extended
the offer to all Hartford stockholders. Pursuant to that offer, ITT acquired over ninety-five percent of the 21outstanding Hartford stock,
solely in exchange for ITT voting stock.

In 1974, shortly before the statute of limitations for the year of the
exchange was to expire,2 2 the Internal Revenue Service retroactively

revoked its 1969 rulings that the exchange qualified as a B reorganization and proceeded to assert deficiencies against the Hartford stockat least
holders.2 3 Over 900 stockholders filed petitions in the tax court; 24
one paid the deficiency and sued for recovery in district court.
In both the tax court and the district court, the Hartford stockholders moved for a summary judgment on the ground that the 1970 exchange qualified as a B reorganization. To eliminate issues of fact, they

conceded for purposes of the motion that ITT be treated as though it
still owned the eight percent it purchased for cash, notwithstanding the
sale to Mediobanca, and that such cash purchases were made with a
for cash to avoid violation of the condition in § 368(a)(1)(B) that the acquisition must be
solely for voting stock. See Rev. Rul. 72-354, 1972-2 C.B. 216 (approving an unconditional
sale to set the stage for a B reorganization).
21. Pierson v. United States, 472 F. Supp. at 960; Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at
730-31. Hartford stock acquired in the exchange by ITT consisted of the 8% block previously sold to Mediobanca and approximately 87% of the remaining stock outstanding.
Nothing in the record suggests that the original owners of the block sold to Mediobanca
retained some Hartford stock and subsequently exchanged it for ITT stock. There is, however, a conceivable overlap between the original owners of the stock purchased by ITT between December 23, 1968 and March 13, 1969 (about 2%), and the owners of the 87% that
was exchanged for ITT stock. Given the multitude of Hartford stockholders (over 17,000
participated in the exchange), any such overlap would be negligible, but not without significance to the analysis of B reorganizations in general. See notes 54-57 & accompanying text
infra.
22. See I.R.C. § 6501.
23. The rulings were revoked on the ground that ITT allegedly misrepresented and
omitted information in its supplemental ruling request on the sale of Hartford stock to
Mediobanca. ITT challenged the revocation, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Commissioner exceeded his authority, but the action was dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Alexander, 396 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Del. 1975).
24. Sixteen cases were consolidated for decision in Reeves. Reeves v. Commissioner,
71 T.C. at 727 n.l. Pierson apparently is the only refund action that has been filed.
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view to acquiring control of Hartford. The taxpayers offered no independent arguments in support of the motion: one, that the cash
purchases in 1968 and 1969 were not part of the "plan of reorganization" which culminated in the 1970 stock exchange; and two, that the
acquisition of over eighty percent of the Hartford stock solely for ITT
stock qualified as a B reorganization, regardless of whether the cash
purchases were part of the plan of reorganization. The government
1968 and 1969 disqualified the
maintained that the cash purchases in
25
1970 exchange as a B reorganization.

Plan of Reorganization
The tax court and the district court accepted the argument that the
1970 stock exchange satisfied the requirements of a B reorganization
notwithstanding ITT's cash purchases, 26 thereby eliminating from consideration the taxpayers' first contention-that the "plan of reorganization" did not encompass the cash purchases. That contention, however,
merits discussion here as an alternative ground for appellate review
and perhaps as a means of gaining greater insight into the peculiar
treatment of B reorganizations.
Taxpayers' Attempt to Limit the Plan of Reorganization
The taxpayers framed the issue to involve more than a factual determination of whether the cash purchases should be integrated with
the stock exchange under the step transaction doctrine.27 They maintained that a plan of reorganization includes only specific actions taken
by those corporations which are party to the plan and evidenced by
formally approved, binding corporate documents. In support of this
position they cited numerous cases involving the scope of various plans
of corporate restructuring, placing principal reliance on Commissioner
v. Gordon.2 8 Gordon involved the distribution of stock in a newly
formed subsidiary to stockholders of the parent in a transaction in25. Pierson v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 960-61; Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at
731-32.
26. See text accompanying note 79 infra. On appeal, however, the First and Third
Circuits in both Reeves and Pierson remanded for reconsideration of this issue. Chapman v.
Commissioner, 80 U.S. Tax Cas. T 9330 (1st Cir. 1980); Heverly v. Commissioner, 80 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9332 (3d Cir. 1980).
27. The government agreed that the issue was "primarily one of law." Respondent's
Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Reeves v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 727 (1979), rev'dsub noma.Chapman v. Commissioner, 80 U.S. Tax
Cas. 1 9330 (1st Cir. 1980).
28. 391 U.S. 83 (1968).
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tended to satisfy section

355,29

which accords tax-free treatment to a

distribution of at least eighty percent of a subsidiary's voting stock.
The Supreme Court held that the distributions, which were made in

installments of fifty-seven percent and forty-three percent, separated by
twenty-one months, were separate and therefore taxable as a distribution of earnings and profits because the parent was not obligated to
0
make the latter installment2

Gordon is analogous, but only marginally helpful in defining the
scope of a B reorganization. Where the parent was not obligated to
distribute control of its spun-off subsidiary, Gordon properly held section 355 inapplicable, depriving such a distribution of earnings and
profits of the tax-free treatment which section 355 is intended to confer
only in clear instances of corporate division. 3' Although tax deferral is

the ultimate benefit and objective in both spin-offs and stock-for-stock
exchanges, the control requirements of sections 355 and 368(a)(1)(B)
serve to deny deferral to basically different types of transactions: sec-

tion 355 to a distribution of earnings and profits and section
368(a)(1)(B) to a sale, transactions thought to be undeserving of taxfree treatment for different reasons and potentially having greatly disparate tax consequences. 32 This divergence of concern is sufficient to
discount whatever inferential relevance Gordon may have to B reorga33
nizations.
34
Equally inapposite is Dunlap & Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner,
also cited by the Hartford stockholders, in which the tax court refused
to include the merger of a parent corporation into its newly formed
29. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1) provides that a distribution of stock in a subsidiary to stockholders of the parent is not taxable if, among other things, at least 80% of the subsidiary's stock is
distributed "as part of the distribution."
30. The plan of reorganization stated that the parent corporation expected to distribute
the remaining 43% of the stock withint three years at times related to its need for new capital. The Court held that § 355(a)(1)(D) required a "binding commitment" to integrate subsequent distributions with its first installment. 391 U.S. at 96.
31. 391 U.S. at 92-93.
32. Distributions of earnings and profits are taxed as ordinary income under I.R.C.
§§ 61, 301, whereas an exchange that fails qualification under § 368(a)(1)(B) is taxed as a
conventional sale of property entitled to the preferential treatment of capital gains. I.R.C.
§§ 1001, 1201-1202. Treatment of such gain as a dividend under I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) does not
apply in a failing B reorganization. See Turnbow v. Commissioner, 368 U.S. 337 (1961).
33. Moreover, the Court in Gordon explicitly declined to consider whether installment
distributions pursuant to a binding commitment satisfy I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(D), thus impairing
the inference that a sale and exchange separated by a time interval are treated separately
unless part of a binding overall plan. Commissioner-v. Gordon, 391 U.S. at 97 n.11. Cf.
King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 518 (1969) (discounting inference in
Gordon that binding commitment is sine qua non of step transaction doctrine).
34. 47 T.C. 542 (1967).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

subsidiary within the same plan of reorganization that encompassed
subsequent B reorganizations. In each of the subsequent reorganizations the subsidiary acquired control of other corporations in which the
parent had held stock. These B reorganizations, whose purpose was to
set the stage for a successful public offering of the subsidiary's stock,
were contemplated at the outset but were not certain to succeed. Mutual interdependence, the test applied in Dunlap, may have been appropriate for determining whether to integrate the separate forms of
reorganization involved there,35 but there is little to commend its general use as the conclusive determinant of the boundaries of a single B
36
reorganization. The issues simply bear too tenuous a relationship.
35. The issue was whether the taxpayer was entitled to an additional surtax exemption
under I.R.C. § 11, which depended on whether the entire series of transactions constituted a
single A reorganization, as the taxpayer argued, or an F reorganization followed by separate
B reorganizations, as the Commissioner argued. The court agreed with the Commissioner
on the ground that the merger-the F reorganization--contemplated, but did not depend
on, successful consummation of the subsequent stock exchanges. See 47 T.C. at 551.
36. Other cases relied on by the Hartford stockholders for the proposition that a plan of
reorganization is limited to mutually binding, corporate obligations (and therefore excludes
ITT's cash purchases) entail such different circumstances and considerations that they lend
virtually no assistance in setting the parameters of the plan between Hartford and ITT. In
Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942), stock warrants issued as
part of the consideration in a putative C reorganization were held to violate the "solely"
requirement in the predecessor of § 368(a)(1)(C), even where they expire unexercised, because the existence of a reorganization is determined as of the date of the exchange. West
Street-Erie Boulevard Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1969), permitted a corporation that adopted a plan of liquidation to revoke it when circumstances changed and
adopt a substitute plan to begin anew the twelve-month period under I.R.C. § 337. Neither
case is helpful in determining whether ITT's cash purchases were part of its plan of reorganization with Hartford.
Nor are United States v. Rodgers, 102 F.2d 335 (3d. Cir. 1939), modifying 94 F.2d 666
(3d Cir. 1938), and Bruce v. Helvering, 76 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1935), of any benefit. The
taxpayer in Rodgers sold 43% of his stock in a corporation for cash and, pursuant to a
simultaneous agreement, exchanged his remaining 57% for stock of the consolidated entity
resulting from a merger with the purchasing corporation. In response to the government's
argument that gain on all the stock disposed of should be taxed to the extent of boot under
the predecessor of § 356, the court treated the cash sale and merger exchange as separate
transactions, the former taxable, the latter not. Similarly, the taxpayer in Bruce sold 200
shares of stock for cash and later the same day, but ptirsuant to an entirely new offer unbeknownst to the taxpayer until that moment, exchanged her remaining 500 shares for stock of
the purchasing corporation. Again the issue was whether gain on the second transaction was
taxable to the extent of boot, and again the taxpayer won, with the court treating the sale
and exchange as separate transactions. In neither case did the government dispute the qualification of the second transaction, the exchange, as a reorganization; boot always has been
permissible in statutory mergers and was not interdicted in B reorganizations until 1934,
well after the years involved in Bruce. Rather, the government contended only that gain on
the exchange was taxable to the extent cash received, less gain recognized on the concededly
taxable sale, a result now precluded in a failing B reorganization by Turnbow v. Commis-
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Extending the Step Transaction Doctrine

The government's position in Reeves and Pierson was that the step
sioner, 368 U.S. 337 (1961). For this reason Rodgers and Bruce, although superficially supportive of the Hartford stockholders, are distinguishable.
George L. Riggs, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 474 (1975), held that a corporation's
general intent to liquidate when less than 80% of its stock is owned by a corporate taxpayer
does not preclude application of§ 332 if the taxpayer's ownership is increased to 80% before
the plan of liquidation is adopted. Like West Street-Erie Boulevard, this case is concerned
with timing conditions of favorable liquidation provisions and has only the thinnest connection with the constitution of a B reorganization.
Finally, American Potash & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 402 F.2d 1000 (Ct. Cl.
1968), modiy'ing 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968), raises an issue very close to that facing the
Hartford stockholders but leaves its resolution unclear. The taxpayer acquired 48% of the
target company's stock, solely for its voting stock, in an unsuccessful takeover bid. Fourteen
months later it acquired the remaining 52%, again solely for voting stock. Relying on the
twelve-month rule in Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c) (1955), the court held that the first exchange
constituted part of a B reorganization only if both exchanges were part of a "continuing
offer" and remanded for trial on that issue. Further confusion is added by a footnote stating
that a "different situation" is encountered where the first acquisition is for cash. 402 F.2d at
1001 n.3.
In further support of the position that a plan of reorganization includes only such specific actions, the taxpayers also cited various pieces of legislative history and treasury regulations bearing on the scope of a plan of reorganization. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-455, § 806(g)(3), 90 Stat. 1606 (defining adoption of plan of reorganization in terms
of formally approved corporate resolutions for purposes of effective date of new loss carryover rules in I.R.C. § 382(b)); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A132-33 (1954)
(stock acquisitions without "clear connection" treated separately); REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933), reprintedinJ.
SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAws, 1938-1861 at 339 (1938)
(plan does not encompass individual shareholder action taken before arrangement of terms);
61 CONG. REc. 6561-66 (1921), reprintedin J. SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS, 1938-1861 at 793-94 (remarks of Sen. McCumber on right of
majority of stockholders to reorganize); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-3(a) (1955) (requiring formal
adoption of plan by each corporation); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(g) (1955) ("plan of reorganization" does not broaden definition of reorganization but limits nonrecognition to exchanges
directly part of transaction described in § 368(a)); Treas. Reg. § 1.383-3(c)(3) (1975) (same as
rule for effective date of loss carryover rules in § 382(b)).
The legislative history is simply too unfocused to be conclusive on the point for which it
was offered. The definition of a plan contained in the effective date rules in the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 and regulations under § 383 coincides with that offered by the taxpayers, but its
purpose was to establish definite indices of when a particular plan was adopted in order to
eliminate disputes over whether a reorganization predated the effective date of new law, not
to provide a substantive definition of a plan. Similarly, Treas. Reg. § 1.368-3(a) is concerned
with recordkeeping and disclosure requirements, not with the substantive determination of
what transactions are included within a plan. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(g) literally forecloses the
construction that a plan of reorgnization embraces something broader than the reorganization itself. Whatever the intent of this provision may be, see generally Manning, "In Pursuance of the Plan of Reorganization" The Scope of the Reorganization Provisions of the
InternalRevenueCode, 72 HARV. L. REV. 881, 885 (1959), it cannot mean as a general rule
that a written plan describing a B reorganization renders the exchange nontaxable totally
without regard to preceding events and understandings. See text accompanying note 48

infra.
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transaction doctrine37 requires inclusion within the plan of reorganization of all acquisitions made after the acquiring corporation's "scheme
of action" to acquire is formed. 38 This approach, which would lump
ITT's cash purchases with the subsequent exchange and consequently
violate the rule against boot in B reorganizations, essentially equates
"plan of reorganization" with intent to acquire. A novel theory, it requires more analysis than perfunctory reliance on step transaction cases
outside the field of B reorganizations.
Courts frequently have applied the step transaction doctrine to determine whether a series of transactions should be governed by the reorganization provisions. Characterization of the transactions as a
particular type of reorganization, or something other than a reorganization, depends on the end result intended by the parties rather than the
form of the component steps, traditional substance versus form analysis. The interdependence of the steps and the time lapse between them
are important factors as well. 39 The doctrine traditionally is applied in
the areas of liquidation-reincorporation, 40 remote continuity-of-interest, 4 1 and two-step asset acquisition. 42 Such applications produce de37. See generally Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactionsin CorporateReorganizations, 12
N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 247 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Mintz & Plumb].
38. Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 727,741 (1979), rep'dsub nom. Chapman v. Commissioner, 80 U.S. Tax Cas. 9330 (1st Cir. 1980).
39. See Mintz & Plumb, supra note 37, at 249-51. See also Levin & Bowen, Taxable
and Tax-Free Two-Step Acquisitions and Minority Squeeze-Outs, 33 TAx L. REV. 425, 428
(1978).
40. Liquidation of a corporation followed by a planned transfer of substantially all the
operating assets to another corporation owned by the same shareholders is collapsed into a
single D reorganization, which results in dividend treatment to the extent of earnings and
profits retained by the shareholders, rather than capital gain on the liquidation distribution
and a stepped-up basis in the reincorporated assets, -results that would obtain if the component steps in the overall plan were treated separately. See, e.g., Ringwalt v. United States,
549 F.2d 89 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 906 (1977); Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d
874 (5th Cir. 1966).
41. Prior to a string of amendments to I.R.C. § 368 beginning in 1954, the acquiring
corporation in a B or C reorganization was not permitted either to effect the exchange by
transferring stock of its parent or to transfer the acquired stock or assets to a subsidiary,
because the continuity of the acquired corporation's (or its stockholders') interest was considered to be too remote. Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454 (1938); Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 (1937). Attempts to circumvent this rule by making a direct acquisition
and then transferring the acquired property to a subsidiary in an ostensibly separate transaction were defeated by the step transaction doctrine. Eg., Avco Mfg. Corp. v. Commissioner,
25 T.C. 975 (1956).
42. When a corporation implements a plan to acquire the assets of another corporation
by acquiring stock control and then merging with or liquidating the acquired corporation,
courts may ignore the separate steps and treat the overall transaction as a direct acquisition
of assets. E.g., Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aj'dper
curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951). See also Levin & Bowen,
Taxable and Tax-Free Two-Step Acquistions andMinority Squeeze-Outs, 33 TAX L. REV. 425
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fensible results, but care must be taken not to extend the doctrine to

transactions bereft of attempts to avoid tax or to exalt form over sub43

stance-the usual offenses which the doctrine was created to redress.
The precise test employed to determine whether a series of transactions
should be treated as an integrated whole varies with the type of transactions involved. Interdependence of the steps in an overall plan may
dominate the analysis in one class of cases, whereas the intent of the
parties dominates in others, with the decision of whether to integrate
possibly turning on which approach is used. The lesson here is that the

step transaction doctrine has not been applied uniformly in all types of
reorganizations. 44
This lesson underscores the simplistic reasoning inherent in the
government's conclusory position that all stock acquisitions consummated after the acquiring corporation forms a general intent to gain

control of a target company, as manifested in a "scheme of action,"
must be integrated for purposes of determining the existence of a valid
B reorganization. Such an approach fails to take account of the historical purpose and effect of the rule against boot in B reorganizations, 45 a
stricture unique among the various types of acquisitive reorganizations.
Moreover, it is without direct judicial support. No case has seriously
addressed the issue of whether previous acquisitions of stock for cash
46
destroy a subsequent and otherwise unassailable B reorganization.
(1978); Note, The Relevancy of Subjective Intent in Two-Step Asset Acquisitions, 42 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 589 (1974).
43. The doctrine theoretically is applicable whether the result is imposition of, or relief
from, taxation. See cases cited in Mintz & Plumb, supra note 37, at 248. As a practical
matter, however, the government is usually the party seeking to undo the form of the transactions. But see, e.g., King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1969)
(doctrine applied in taxpayer's favor to treat taxable stock acquisition followed by merger as
a single A reorganization).
44. See B. BIrTKER & J. EUsTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS 14.51, at 14-131 (4th ed. 1979); Mintz & Plumb, supra note 37, at 25253, 276.
45. Until the lower court in opinions in Reeves and Pierson,no case had permitted the
presence of any boot in a B reorganization. See text accompanying notes 73-74 infra.
46. Prior to 1954, a B reorganization was defined as the "acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting stock, of at least 80 per centum of the
voting stock and at least 80 per centum of the total number of shares of all other classes of
stock of another corporation." Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(g)(1)(B), 53 Stat.
40 (current version at I.R.C. § 368(a)(ly(B)). This language was thought to preclude "creeping" reorganizations; 80% of the stock had to be acquired in one bite, solely for voting stock.
But see Lutkins v. United States, 312 F.2d 803 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963)
(dissenting opinion); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 273 (1954). Thus, creeping stock
acquisition cases decided under the 1939 Code, or under similar provisions in effect before
1939, do not support application of the step transaction doctrine in creeping B reorganizations under the 1954 Code. The pre-1954 cases finding against a B reorganization do not

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

Reasoning by analogy from cases involving other types of reorganizations that the step transaction doctrine is applicable in stock-for-stock
exchanges such as the Hartford-ITT exchange thus, is not necessarily
correct. Furthermore, the step transaction doctrine should not be regarded as a self-operating rule of law with independent content. Its
proper function should be to pierce formality only where necessary to
preserve the integrity of statutory rules or to prevent form from
camouflaging substance; its content should derive from those rules.
The doctrine should not be used to bootstrap preconceived views of
what constitutes a proper result. Nor should it supplant interpretation
of specific statutory language, no matter how difficult, in light of relevant policy considerations. The ultimate issue is not whether the step
transaction doctrine applies, but whether the apparent consequences of
particular transactions violate a statutory rule or policy. The inquiry is
47
hardly satisfied by an incantation of the step transaction doctrine.
hinge on integration of the exchange with previous cash purchases flowing from an ultimate
intent to gain control.
In Pulfer v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 677 (1941), the acquiring corporation purchased
69% of the acquired corporation's stock in 1921 and acquired nearly all the remaining 3 1%
in 1935, solely for its voting stock. Without making any attempt to link the purchase with
the exchange, the Board summarily held that 80% was not acquired solely for voting stock.
The acquiring corporation in Commissioner v. Air Reduction Co., 130 F.2d 145 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 681 (1942), purchased 6% of the target company's stock and
acquired 66% in exchange for its voting stock before 1935. During 1935 it purchased an
additional 12% and acquired the remaining 16% in a stock-for-stock exchange. Disposing of
a subsidiary issue to which it devoted only three sentences, the court concluded that the cash
purchases disqualified the 1935 exchange from being solely for voting stock. The opinion
intimates no factual basis for integrating the purchases with the exchange, nor even mentions the step transaction doctrine. In Lutkins v. United States, 312 F.2d 803 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963), the acquiring corporation exchanged its voting stock for 65% of
the target company's stock in 1912, and purchased an additional 3% in numerous market
transactions between 1929 and 1951. In 1952 it acquired an additional 30% solely for its
voting stock. Interpreting the 1939 Code to require acquisition of 80% in a single transaction, the court held that the acquisition of 30% in 1952 was not a B reorganization. It added
parenthetically that the cash purchases were unrelated. 312 F.2d at 805.
Had the acquiring corporations in Pufer,Air Reduction, and Lutkins not made the cash
purchases, their exchanges would have failed as B reorganizations nonetheless, for none
satisfied the then-existing definition of a B reorganization. Furthermore, Puifer and Lutkins
reject any factual basis for the step transaction doctrine, and Air Reduction is silent on the
point. See the discussion of Bruce and Rodgers at note 36 supra.
Of the B reorganization cases, only Howard v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 792 (1955), rev'd
on other grounds, 238 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956), links proximate cash purchases with the
exchange at issue under step transaction rubric. And there, unlike the Hartford-ITT exchange, the purchases and exchange were simultaneous and pursuant to a single written
agreement negotiated by an individual acting on behalf of all stockholders of the acquired
corporation. See note 81 infra.
47. Cf.Rubin v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970) (rejecting application of
judicial doctrine in lieu of §482 in an analogous situation). In Rubin, the court concluded:
"Resort to section 482 is clearly superior to the blunt tool employed by the Tax Court.
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A Reasonable Definition of Plan of Reorganization

Significantly, the term "plan of reorganization" does not appear in
section 368(a)(1)(B)'s definition of a B reorganization, but rather in section 354(a)(1), which accords nonrecognition of gain or loss to ex-

changes of stock "in pursuance of the plan of reorganization.

'48

The

Code's segregation of definitional and operative provisions and its con-

finement of the broader "in pursuance of the plan" language to the
latter, suggest that not every transaction connected with a putative reorganization must be considered to determine if a reorganization actually
occurs. 49 Without placing undue emphasis on this textual distincition, 50 there is no dispute, for example, that neither B nor C reorganiza-

tions definitionally require liquidation of the target company; yet such
a liquidation, if intended as part of the overall plan, is nontaxable by
virtue of its connection with the reorganization. 5' Treatment of the liquidation is governed by section 354(a)(1) without reference to the definitions in sections 368(a)(1)(B) 52 and (C). If the liquidation does not

have a sufficient factual nexus with the reorganization, its consequences
are determined under the liquidation provisions of the Code without
negating the reorganization.
Analogous reasoning applies to a stock-for-stock exchange accompanied by a proximate 53 cash purchase of stock of the target company
References to 'substance over form' and the 'true earner' of income merely restate the issue
in cases like this: Who is the 'true earner'? What is substance and what is form? Moreover,
they do so in a way which makes it appear that these questions can be answered simply by
viewing the facts with appropriate suspicion. The language of § 482 more clearly commands
analysis of the facts in terms of the competing policies outlined above." Id at 653.
48. 48 I.R.C. § 354(o)(1)
49. See generallyManning, "In Pursuanceofthe Plan ofReorganization-- The Scope of
the ReorganizationProvisions of the InternalRevenue Code, 72 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1959).
50. Addition of the "in pursuance of the plan" language in the Revenue Act of 1924,
ch. 234, § 203(b)(2), 43 Stat. 256 (current version at I.R.C. § 354(a)(1)) was described as a
minor change in phraseology. S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1924), reprintedin
1939-1 (part 2) C.B. 276.
51. See Rev. Rul. 57-518, 1957-2 C.B. 253 (assuming that liquidation of the acquired
corporation immediately following a C reorganization is nontaxable despite § 331); Rev.
Rul. 67-274, 1967-2 C.B. 141 (treating liquidation of the acquired corporation following a B
reorganization as tantamount to a C reorganization and thus nontaxable).
52. Rev. Rul. 67-274, 1967-2 C.B. 141, moots the issue by treating liquidation of the
acquired corporation following a B reorganization as a C reorganization under the step
transaction doctrine. Accord, Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 778 (1973), modified,511 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1975). But see American Potash & Chemical Corp. v. United
States, 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl.), modofed, 402 F.2d 1000 (Ct. Cl. 1968). The liquidation would
be nontaxable whether the reorganization fell under § 368(a)(1)(B) or (C), but the limitation
on net operating loss carryovers in I.R.C. § 382(b) does not apply to B reorganizations. See
generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
14.13, at 14-46 (4th ed. 1979).
SHAREHOLDERS

53.

Distant purchases present no problem under the step transaction doctrine. They
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by the acquiring corporation. Absent an attempt to use the form of
section 368(a)(1)(B) to avoid taxation of an exchange which otherwise
would be taxable, no proper purpose is served by letting the purchase
disqualify the exchange as a reorganization. Certainly the Code does
not require this result. In this instance, proximate stock sales should be
treated outside the plan of reorganization, as if totally unrelated. The
key to this analysis, as the following situations illustrate, lies in the
makeup of the respective target company stockholders participating in
the exchange and the sale.
Situation #1. If the overlap between stockholders of the target company who participate in both the sale and the exchange is sufficiently
low that the stockholders participating only in the exchange had control54 of the acquired corporation, destruction of the B reorganization
would be caused exclusively by transactions between the other stockholder group and the acquiring corporation. Those were the facts in
the Hartford-ITT exchange. Regardless of whether the stockholders
receiving only stock are aware of previous cash sales by other stockholders, no basis exists for a charge of tax avoidance or using form to
conceal substance. The exchange group could have effected a B reorganization on its own with the acquiring corporation. Infecting such an
exchange with transactions between other parties under step transaction rubric is unwarranted.5 5 However the step transaction test might
be verbalized, some degree of mutual intent should be indispensable to
its application.5 6 To stockholders who receive only stock of the acquiring corporation, cash sales by other stockholders are a matter of indif57
ference and should be immaterial for tax purposes as well.
In contrast, stockholders who receive only cash would be outside
the plan of reorganization and would have to recognize gain or loss. A
more difficult question, however, concerns the treatment of stockholders who receive both cash and stock. Taxation of their gain to the exare taxable sales and totally ignored for purposes of determining the consequences of the
exchange. See generally Levin & Bowen, Taxable and Tax-Free Two Step Acquisitions and
Minority Squeeze-Outs, 33 TAX. L. REV. 425, 428-30 (1978).
54. See note 1 supra for the definition of "control."
55. Cf.I.R.C. § 351(a) (nontaxable exchange where transferor group has control).
56. Butcf King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (doctrine
applied in favor of shareholder who was not party to overall plan).
57. See Manning, "In Pursuanceofthe Plan ofReorganization" The Scope ofthe Reorganization Provisionsof the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HARV. L. REV. 881, 913 (1959). Cf.

Dallas Downtown Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 114 (1949), acq. 1950-1 C.B. 2 (acquiring corporation's liquidation of target shortly after acquiring its stock does not impute
sale of assets by target). See generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS f 11.44, at 11-45 (4th ed. 1979).
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tent of cash received under section 35658 would be an acceptable result,
but is foreclosed by the rule that the presence of any boot destroys a B
reorganization and consequently renders section 356 inapplicable. 59
The trial court opinions in Reeves and Pierson may have cast doubt on

the continued validity of that rule, but until their approach gains acceptance, the plan of reorganization issue will have continuing significance.
If stockholders participating in the sale have knowledge of the ac-

quiring corporation's intent to consummate an exchange and subsequently participate in that exchange, granting them nonrecognition in
the latter transaction creates tax avoidance potential.60 But excising
their sale from the plan of reorganization and nonetheless treating their
participation in the exchange as a taxable event is worse, for in effect it

would make the existence of a B reorganization a stockholder-by-stockholder inquiry. Not only would this complicate both the ruling process
and the task of representing the consequences of a proposed exchange

but, more importantly, it also would add another layer of confusion to
an already perplexing area. Limiting the separate treatment of cash
sales to situations in which those stockholders participating only in the
exchange have control of the target company sufficiently minimizes tax

avoidance potential.
Situation #2. The foregoing thesis could even be extended to situations
in which stockholders participating only in the exchange do not have
control of the target company. In such a case, a B reorganization could

not take place unless stock held by that group plus stock exchanged
(not sold) by shareholders participating in both the sale and exchange
equalled at least eighty percent of the target company's stock.61 Admittedly, the equities in favor of the former group are less compelling if
58. "If section 354. . . would apply to an exchange but for the fact that the property
received in the exchange consists not only of property permitted by section 354.. . to be
received without the recognition of gain but also of other property or money, then the gain,
if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an amount not in excess of the sum of such
money and the fair market value of such other property." I.R.C. § 356(a)(1).
59. Turnbow v. Commissioner, 368 U.S. 337 (1961).
60. Of course no such potential exists where the stockholders do not have knowledge of
the acquiring corporation's plans; courts have no difficulty rejecting the step transaction doctrine in that circumstance. See note 36 supra (discussing Bruce v. Helvering).
Moreover, tax avoidance is a dubious criterion for resolving reorganization issues. The
reorganization provisions openly encourage partial tax avoidance through deferral; to withhold the benefit of deferral because one carefully structures his or her affairs to achieve it
seems paradoxical. Less mysterious means are available to protect the revenue. See generally Gunn, Tax Avoidance, 76 MICH. L. REv. 733 (1978).
61. This assumes, for simplicity, that the acquiring corporation owned no stock in the
target company before the proximate purchase and exchange. If that is not the case, stock
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that group does not own sufficient stock on its own to transfer control
of the acquired corporation. The availability of nonrecognition in exchanges of infinitesimal amounts of stock afforded by the present treatment of "creeping" B reorganizations, however, aptly illustrates the
anomaly of taxing the exchange of a significant amount of stock merely
62
because other stockholders recently sold part of their stock for cash.
Using the term "plan of reorganization" to separate a stock-forstock exchange from proximate stock sales seems particularly appropriate in reorganizations of publicly held corporations. The ubiquituous
presence of government, the required formality, the anonymity of parties, and the resistance to acquisition that so often exist in public mergers all operate to minimize the potential for manipulating form that
inheres to a greater degree in dealings with closely held corporations.
ITT's tax counsel certainly knew at the time the cash purchases were
made that the Internal Revenue Service might integrate them with a
subsequent stock exchange. 63 The probable fact is that ITT, confronted
with resistance from Hartford and the Department of Justice, was not
then concerned as much with the precise form of what proved to be a
difficult acquisition as with its chances of merging in any form.64 It did
not know at the outset that its plan of merger would succeed and that it
would then purchase stock for cash and cleverly omit the purchase
from its formal plan of reorganization with Hartford. A variety of exigencies having nothing to do with tax considerations might explain
why the acquisitions in 1968 and 1969 were for cash instead of ITT
stock. The ultimate form of the exchange was dictated by action taken
by the Connecticut Insurance Commissioner nine months after ITT's
last purchase was consummated. 65 Denying qualification of the exchange as a B reorganization on the basis of ITT's historical intent to
acquire is a specious application of the step transaction doctrine. Such
previously acquired in concededly unrelated transactions would count toward the 80% control requirement. See note 61 infra.
62. Compare the definition of a B reorganization in the 1939 Code, note 46 supra,with
the 1954 Code, note 1 supra. The amendments in 1954 accord tax-free treatment to an

exchange which increases the acquiring corporation's ownership to, or beyond, the control
level, regardless of the amount of stock acquired in the exchange. These so-called "creep-

ing" reorganizations were not permissible under the 1939 Code. See note 46 supra.
63. ITT was advised in writing of this risk as early as December 31, 1968. Respondent's Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment at 3,

Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 727 (1979), re'dsubnom. Chapman v. Commissioner, 80
U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9330 (1st Cir. 1980).
64. See id
65. Nevertheless, the prohibition of cash acquisitions would have applied in either of
the forms apparently contemplated by ITT. See id See'notes 15, 16 supra. The boot relaxa-

tion rule in I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E)(ii) was not in effect then.
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an application seemingly ignores the events leading up to the exchange
and imposes the most significant consequences on the Hartford stockholders, the taxpayers least able to control ITT's "tainted" state of
66
mind.
Given this perspective, the Hartford stockholders seem correct in
their assertion that the plan of reorganization between Hartford and
ITT should be limited to the terms of the written agreement between
the companies. Nothing in the policy of the reorganization provisions
warrants an interpretation that straitjackets the form in which acquisitions must develop. Acquiring corporations should have the initial
flexibility to probe a takeover possibility in whatever manner seems
most reasonable, without jeopardizing the treatment of a subsequent
reorganization. The "plan of reorganization" language is an appropriate tool for implementing flexibility.
Despite the appeal of this approach in the Hartford-ITT exchange,
one can imagine situations involving closely held or semiprivate corporations in which the rule would produce questionable results. Suppose
Corporation A, a public company, wants to acquire all the stock of
Corporation B, seventy shares of which are owned by X and thirty by
Y. X is happy to accept Corporation A stock, but Y wants to sell out
for as much cash as possible. Ythen sells twenty shares to Corporation
A for cash and subsequently exchanges the remaining ten shares, along
with X's seventy shares, solely for Corporation A voting stock. This is
the second situation discussed above. 67 Should Y escape tax on the ten
shares exchanged for Corporation A stock? Probably not, but that
would be the result if the cash sale was excised from the "plan of reorganization." This concern over a wooden separation of sales proximate
to the acquisition of a closely held company is not meant to suggest a
different definition of "plan" for private companies, but rather, merely
to recognize the greater opportunity for manipulation. Thus, even an
interpretation that is beholden more to policy than to step transaction
criteria can be problematic. A very cautious and sparing use of the step
transaction doctrine might be a preferable solution under the present
statutory framework. One hardly can be optimistic about such a prospect, however, in view of the government's zeal in Reeves and Pierson.
66. ITT agreed to provide counsel for the Hartford stockholders and to indemnify
them for tax liability resulting from the exchange being treated as a taxable event. This fact,
however, should be irrelevant to the determination of their tax consequences. But f Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979) (United States estopped from challenging in separate action adjudication against third party on same issue in previous litigation financed and
directed by United States).
67. See notes 61-62 & accompanying text supra.
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Of course dependence on the meaning of such fluid words as "plan
of reorganization" would be obviated by an interpretation of "solely"
in section 368(a)(1)(B) that allowed for the transfer of a relatively small
amount of boot in a B reorganization. An elastic definition of a plan is
necessary only to maintain some semblance of equilibrium with the
heretofore rigidly literal judicial interpretation of "solely." Although
the Hartford stockholders hardly can be faulted for presenting two theories to support finding a B reorganization, in reality the two theories
are so interrelated that meaningful analysis of one, without reference to
the other, is impossible. Perhaps that is why the main opinion in
Reeves conditions its resolution of how "solely" is interpreted on the
factual premise that the stock exchange stood apart from the previous
cash purchases. That premise, however, is indistinguishable from the
taxpayers' plan of reorganization argument, which the court purported
not to decide.

"Solely" for Voting Stock
As stated at the outset, the policy supporting tax-free treatment of
corporate reorganizations is that a change merely in the form of a corporate investment should not be a taxable event; rather, tax consequences should be deferred until a more substantial change in the
investment occurs. Thus, tax law does not act as a barrier to legitimate
restructuring of corporate ownership. Subsumed within this policy is
the notion that the privilege of tax deferral should be available only
where an acceptable percentage of the owners of the acquired corporation continue as owners of the acquiring corporation. This continuityof-interest doctrine was fashioned by the courts during the formative
years of the reorganization provisions to deny deferral where continuity of ownership was deemed insufficient. 68 A concern of the same
general nature moved Congress to insert "solely" into the definition of
a B reorganization in the Revenue Act of 1934,69 to assure that at least
eighty percent ownership in the acquired corporation was transformed
70
by the reorganization into ownership in the acquiring corporation.
68. See Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296
U.S. 378 (1935); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933);
Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S.
599 (1933).
69. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 112(g)(1)(B), 48 Stat. 705 (1934) (current version at
I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(B), (C)). The text of this section as it relates to a B reorganization is
substantially identical to its successor in the Internal Revnue Code of 1939, quotedat note 46
supra.

70. See S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1934), reprintedin 1939-1 (part 2)
C.B. 598-99; H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-14 (1934) reprintedin 1939-1 (part 2)
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The addition of "solely" may be viewed simply as a quantified codification of the continuity-of-interest doctrine in B reorganizations 7' and
should be interpreted accordingly.
Much has been written in support of a liberal interpretation that
would allow a B reorganization in a transaction in which eighty percent

of the target company's stock is acquired solely for voting stock, regardless of the type of consideration used to acquire any additional
stock.72 Before the lower court decisions in Reeves and Pierson, however, an uninterrupted line of decisions had interpreted "solely" as an
absolute interdiction of boot in a B reorganization. 7 3 Notwithstanding

that history, both trial courts regarded application of the tenet to the
Hartford-ITT exchange as a case of first impression. Cases giving rise
to the antiquated assumption that the slightest amount of boot destroys
a B reorganization were distinguished on the factual ground that none

involved a single, boot-free acquisition of eighty percent of the target
74
company's stock.
The opinions carefully trace the path by which "solely" acquired
its reputed content and persuasively chip away the foundation. The
admonition that "solely leaves no leeway" originated in Helvering v.
Southwest Consolidated Corp.,7 5 an assets acquisition case in which

boot comprised thirty-seven percent of the consideration. Subsequent
decisions cursorily assumed the aphorism to be equally applicable in
stock acquisitions, 76 despite the existence of variant considerations and
C.B. 563-65. These reports reveal congressional concern over the tax-free treatment of what
essentially were disguised sales. "Solely" provided an objective distinction between "reorganizations" laced with too much boot and those possessing sufficient continuity.
71. See Vernava, The Howardand Turnbow Cases and the "Solely" Requirement of B
Reorganizations,20 TAx L. REv. 387, 394 (1965).
72. See Merritt, Tax-Free CorporationAcquisitions-TheLaw and the ProposedRegulalions, 53 MICH. L. Rav. 911, 928 (1955); Toll, Transfers of Boot in Stock-for-Stock Acquisitions, 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 1347, 1366-68 (1968); Vemava, The Howardand Turnbow Cases
andthe "Soleiy"RequirementofB Reorganizations,20 TAX L. REv. 387, 394 (1965). But see
Comment, The "Soleofor Voting Stock" Requirement ofB Reorganizations:Reeves v. Commissioner, 79 COLUM. L. Rav. 774 (1979) (concluding that Reeves was decided incorrectly).
73. Tumbow v. Commissioner, 368 U.S. 337 (1961), a 'g 286 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1960);
Lutkins v. United States, 312 F.2d 803 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963); Commissioner v. Air Reduction Co., 130 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 317 U.S. 681 (1942); Mills v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 393 (1962), rev'd on othergrounds, 331 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1964);
Howard v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 792 (1955), rev'don othergrounds, 238 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.
1956); Pulfer v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 677 (1941). For a discussion of the facts in Air
Reduction, Luikins, and Pufer, see note 46 supra.
74. But see Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 727 (1979), rev'd sub nom. Chapman v.
Commissioner, 80 U.S. Tax Cas. 19330 (Ist Cir. 1980). (Scott, J., concurring; Quealy &
Wilbur, J.J., dissenting).

75.
76.

315 U.S. 194 (1942).
The law applied in Southwest Consolidated treated B and C reorganizations in a
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a developing statutory lenience toward boot in assets acquisitions. 77
Furthermore, much of Southwest Consolidated'sprogeny in the B reorsingle paragraph, each subject to the same "solely" requirement. Revenue Act of 1934, ch.
277, § 112(g)(1)(B), 48 Stat. 705 (codified at I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B), (C)). An amendment to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 separated B and C reorganizations into § 112(g)(l)(B)
and (C), with separate "solely" requirements, the latter permitting the acquiring corporation
to assume the acquired corporation's liabilities. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 247, 53
Stat. 870 (current version at I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B), (C)). Only Commissioner v. Turnbow,
286 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1960), a/f'd, 368 U.S. 337 (1961); Howard v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d
943 (7th Cir. 1956); and Mills v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 393 (1962), rev'd on other grounds,
331 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1964), have seriously considered the applicability of Southwest Consolidated to B reorganizations.
77. In addition to the 1939 amendment allowing the acquiring corporation to assume
the acquired corporation's liabilities in a C reorganization, see note 76 supra, I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(2)(B) was enacted in 1954 to permit up to 20% boot in a C reorganization. The trial
courts in Reeves and Pierson thought these retreats from a strict interpretation of "solely,"
combined with statutory changes in the definition of a B reorganization in 1954 (permitting
creeping reorganizations) and again in 1964 (permitting use of parent's stock) that did not
tamper with the "solely" requirement, plausibly suggested that Congress never understood
the rule in Southwest Consolidatedto be applicable to B reorganization. This mind-reading
is buttressed by language in the regulations underlying § 112(g)(l)(B) of the 1939 Code, see
note 46 supra, which indicates boot may be used to acquire stock in excess of 80%: "'In
order to qualify as a 'reorganization' under section 112(g)(1)(B), the acquisition by the acquiring corporation of the requiredamount of the stock of the other corporation must be in
exchange solely for all or part of the voting stock of the acquiring corporation. If for example Corporation X exchange non-voting preferred stock or bonds in addition to all or a part
of its voting stock in the acquisition of the requiredamount of stock in Corporation Y, the
transaction is not a 'reorganization' under section 112(g)(1)(B)." Treas. Reg. I11,
§ 29.112(g)-2 (1942) (emphasis added). And in 1964, in its deliberation on the amendment
allowing use of the parent's stock in a B reorganization, Congress stated that B and C reorganizations should be treated the same. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1964)
reprintedin [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1673, 1756. The upshot of this complicated journey through the legislative thought process is that statutory liberalization of
"solely" in B reorganizations was unnecessary because Southwest Consolidated never applied to them. This must be regarded as surmise, however, for Congress has remained silent
long after the holdings in Howard and Mills that no boot is permitted in a B reorganization.
Cf.Commissioner v. Turnbow, 286 F.2d 669, 674 (9th Cir. 1960), a i'd,368 U.S. 337 (1961)
(interpreting congressional inaction as approval of a strict "solely" standard); S. REP. No.
1533, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970) (accompanying enactment of § 368(a)(2)(E) and stating
that no stock may be acquired for cash in a B reorganization).
The utility of legislative history in divining whether Congress would have thought the
Hartford-ITT exchange qualified as a B reorganization deserves comment. One writer argued that the lower court holding in Reeves was unwarranted by legislative history, on the
strength of history which either is concededly inconclusive or accompanies the enactment of
a provision not even in force when the exchange in Reeves occurred. Comment, The "Soleiy
for Voting Stock" Requirement ofB Reorganizations. Aeeves v. Commissioner, 79 COLUM. L.

774, 792-96 (1979). In reality, no one knows what Congress intended because Congress
never said; all one can do is guess. Basing the guess on isolated statements in reports which
relate to other provisions of the Code is questionable. Where history is inconclusive or only
tenuously related to a particular question, a frank admission to that effect is preferable to
scrutinizing felicitious words for hidden meaning which the authors either didn't contemplate or carefully consider. See also Hart v. United States, 585 F.2d 1025, 1028-29 (Ct. Cl.
1978); Neuborne, Observationson Weber, 54 N.Y.U.L. REv. 546, 553-55 (1979).
REV.
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ganization area involved creeping acquisitions, a technique not permitted under pre-1954 law irrespective of the "solely" issue. 78 Dissatisfied
with inadequate judicial analysis, and finding refuge in the Supreme
Court's veiled intimation in Turnbow v. Commissioner79 that the issue
should be reconsidered, the trial courts in Reeves and Pierson considered themselves unconstrained by precedent. Recognizing that the issue was not free from doubt, and unable to identify a policy that
nonrecognition would violate where eighty percent of the acquired corporation's stock is exchanged solely for voting stock, they held that the
Hartford-ITT exchange satisfied section 368(a)(1)(B).
The holdings differ, however, in one important respect, which can
be explained best in connection with Howard v. Commissioner,80 the
most troublesome case for the Hartford stockholders. Truax-Traer
Coal Company acquired all the outstanding stock of Binkley Coal
Company in a single transaction, over eighty percent for stock and the
rest for cash."' The transaction was denied B reorganization status because it was not solely for voting stock; the same argument made by the
Hartford stockholders that eighty percent for stock is sufficient was rejected. Both the Reeves and Pierson trial courts distinguished Howard
on the ground that the Hartford-ITT exchange in 1970 was free of
boot. 82 Pierson, however, proceeded to reject Howard squarely, holding that section 368(a)(1)(B) is satisfied where eighty percent of the acquired corporation's stock is exchanged solely for voting stock,
regardless of the type of consideration used to acquire any additional
stock in the same transaction. That is also the position taken in the
concurring opinion in Reeves. The main opinion in Reeves, however,
reserved judgment on the vitality of Howard and conditioned its holding on a factual premisle that distinguishes Howard, namely, that the
1970 stock exchange was a single transaction standing apart from the
cash purchases in 1968 and 1969.
78. See note 46 supra.
79. 368 U.S. 337, 344 (1961). Cf. Howard v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 792, 804 (1955),
re'don othergrounds, 238 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956) (construction of "solely" comparable to
that urged by Hartford stockholders might satisfy practical objectives of statute but authorities require the contrary).
80. 24 T.C. 792 (1955), rev'd on othergrounds, 238 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956).
81. 79.82% of the Binkley stock was acquired from stockholders who received only
Truax-Traer stock, 19% from stockholders who received only cash, and the balance from
Parsons College, which received both cash and Truax-Traer stock. The total amount of
Binkley stock acquired for Truax-Traer stock was 80.19%. 24 T.C. at 800.
82. Pierson v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 957, 963-67 (1979), rev'dsub nom. Heverly v.
Commissioner, 80 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9332 (3d Cir. 1980); Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.
727, 737 (1979), rev'dsubnom. Chapman v. Commissioner, 80 U.S. Tax Cas. T 9330 (1st Cir.

1980).
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The main opinion's dismissal in Reeves of what Judge Wilbur re' 3
garded as a "formidable body of directly contrary precedents"
formed the gravamen of his dissent in that case. One can disagree with
his rigid view of the function of stare decisis,8 4 but his trenchant criticism of the methodology used in the main opinion is difficult to quarrel
with. The taxpayers did concede integration of the cash purchases and
the exchange for purposes of their argument that "solely" requires that
only eighty percent control be acquired for voting stock. The concession was essential to an articulate statement of the issue. Yet the main
opinion avoided the issue by assuming the purchases were separate and
only then passing on the content of "solely."'8 5 The more ingenuous
approach of the Pierson trial court and the concurring opinion in
Reeves is preferable and certainly more workable, for it obviates resolution of the separability question.
The trial courts' approach in both Reeves and Pierson is amply
supported by present policy considerations. Hartford remained intact
as an operating insurance company and the owners of eighty-seven percent 86 of its stock continued as stockholders of ITT. Only two prior
stock-for-stock exchanges foundering on the "solely" issue involved
such a high degree of continuity, and they can be explained on other
grounds. 87 The only conceivable objection to deferral of the tax consequences of the Hartford-ITT exchange lies in a statutory relic whose
purpose has not been allowed to illuminate its meaning. The Reeves
and Pierson trial courts imparted an understanding of "solely" which
better comports both with that purpose and with the reality of how
83.

71 T.C. at 744 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).

84. Judge Wilbur's attack on dismissing what he. regarded as indistinguishable precedent probably was shared by those in agreement with the main opinion; only two of the
eleven judges who considered the case agreed with the concurring opinion's position that
Howardshould be overruled. 71 T.C. at 752. This is not the first example of the Tax Court
refusing to overrule old but questionable precedent. See, e.g., Hirst v. Commissioner, 63
T.C. 307 (1974), aff'd, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978); Cowles v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M.
(CCH) 884 (1970). But see Alex v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 322 (1978).

85. See text accompanying note 26 supra. This criticism seems particularly apt in the
context of a motion for summary judgment, which requires that there be no genuine issue of
material fact. See TAX CT. R. PRAC. & PROC. 121.
86. See note 21 supra.
87. Lutkins v. United States, 312 F.2d 803 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963),

was a creeping acquisition occurring over a forty year period. The law then in effect did not
permit creeping B reorganizations, even in the absence of boot. See note 46 supra. Mills v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 393 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 331 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1964),
involved the payment of cash in lieu of fractional shares of stock in the acquiring corporation. The Tax Court's finding that the exchange was not solely for voting stock was reversed
on the ground that the cash did not represent consideration for stock in the acquired corporation.
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;tock acquisitions develop.88 Moreover, that understanding is one
which prevents recognition of loss by sprinkling a small amount of cash
)n an otherwise perfect' B reorganization-a result unobtainable in
)ther types of nontaxable exchanges.8 9
Recommendations
The ultimate disposition of these cases, especially Pierson, will
aelp clarify the meaning of "solely," but confusion over the contours of
i B reorganization will persist regardless of their outcome. Both opinLons declined consideration of the effect of their holdings on creeping
reorganizations. 90 Furthermore, Reeves gave virtually no guidance as
to when an exchange constitutes a single transaction independent of
previous cash purchases. 9' Thus, the lower court decisions were so narrow that any number of variations of the facts in future transactions
could have rendered them distinguishable. True, availability of an advance ruling on the consequences of a proposed transaction diminishes
risk, but a threshold of certainty should exist apart from the Internal
Revenue Service's ruling position. Want of a threshold improperly
substitutes the Service's judgment for that of Congress and the courts
and may hold proposed transactions entirely deserving of tax-free
treatment hostage to a practically unreviewable body of "law." The
Service would not have ruled favorably on the Hartford-ITT exchange
if ITT had not purged itself of the previously purchased stock, yet the
Reeves and Pierson trial courts said the transaction would have been
tax-free anyway. Furthermore, the Service deserves more specific guidance for ruling on proposed transactions. What is needed is a more
definitive legislative statement of the conformation of a B reorganiza88. The Internal Revenue Service often has shown its sensitivity to the need for some
cash to flow in B reorganizations by accommodating formalistic circumvention of the
"solely" requirement. See, e.g., Rev. RuL. 79-89, 1979-I C.B. 152; Rev. Rul. 72-522, 1972-2
C.B. 215; Rev. Rul. 68-562, 1968-2 C.B. 157.
89. See I.R.C. §§ 35 1(b)(2), 356(c), 1031(c). See pa[so Turnbow v. Commissioner, 368
U.S. 337 (1961), in which the stock acquisition was 70% for cash and 30% for stock; the court
there established that § 356 cannot apply to a stock-for-stock exchange and denied B reorganization status by reason of the transfer of boot.
90. Pierson v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 957,961 n.5 (1979), rev'dsubnom. Heverly v.
Commissioner, 80 U.S. Tax Cas. 9332 (3d Cir. 1980); Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.
727,741 n.17 (1979), rev'd sub nom. Chapman v. Commissioner, 80 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9330 (1st
Cir. 1980).
91. The main opinion tersely admonishes against splitting an otherwise single transaction into a sale and exchange. Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 727, 742 n.19 (1979). On
appeal, however, the case was remanded to the trial court for further consideration on the
issue of the scope of the plan of reorganization. Chapman v. Commissioner, 80 U.S. Tax
Cas. T 9330 (1st Cir. 1980).
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tion, taking into account the doctrinal concepts the government and
taxpayers might invoke to support a desired result.
Proposals for major overhaul of the reorganization provisions
have come and gone since 1954.92 The following ideas are intended
once again to provoke thought on a better formula for a B reorganization, but with an awareness that changes in the makeup of a B reorganization should be part of a larger effort (not developed here) 93to unify
the treatment of various forms of acquisitive reorganizations.
As a starting point, "solely" should be deleted from section
368(a)(1)(B). In its place should be substituted a required percentage
of continuity of ownership. To achieve B reorganization status, stock
in the acquiring corporation must comprise at least that percentage of
the total consideration received by stockholders of the acquired corporation. Eighty percent, the quantum prescribed in section 368(c),
would be an acceptable figure; other proposals have suggested fifty percent and sixty-six and two-thirds percent. 94 Selecting the appropriate
figure, however, can wait; recognizing the need for an arbitrary limit
will suffice here. Whatever the figure, it could be applied either on an
aggregate or individual stockholder basis. The former approach would
determine the existence of a B reorganization by reference to the total
consideration transferred by the acquiring corporation, without regard
to the mix of consideration received by any particular stockholder. A
reorganization for one would be a reorganization for all. The alterna92. ADVISORY GROUP ON SUBCHAPTER C OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954,
85th Cong., 2d Sess., REVISED REPORT ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS
75 (1958), reprintedin ADVISORY GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS ON SUBCHAPTERS C, J, AND

K OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 553 (1959) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY GROUP
REPORT]; Surrey, Income Tax Problems of Corporationsand Shareholders. American Law
Institute Tax Project-AmericanBarAssociation Committee Study on Legislative Revision, 14
TAX L. REV. 1, 19 (1958) [hereinafter cited as AL! Study]. The recommendations in the
ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra,were embodied in H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
For a discussion of these reports and other proposals, see Kanter, Cash in a "B" Reorganization.- Effect of Cash Purchaseson "Creeping" Reorgaiiization, 19 TAX L. REV. 441, 462-67
(1964); MacLean, "CreepingAcquisitions", 21 TAX L. REV. 345, 382-86 (1966); Toll, Transfers ofBoot in Stock-for-Stock Acquisitions, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1347, 1365-70 (1968). More
recently, the Committee on Corporate Stockholder Relationships of the Tax Section of the
American Bar Association prepared a legislative recommendation to unify the treatment of
various forms of acquisitive reorganizations (the Narrow Project). Papers reflecting on and

criticizing the recommendation are tentatively scheduled for publication in the Spring, 1980
issue of the Tax Law Review. Finally, the American Law Institute circulated a Tentative
Draft of a 1977 proposal to revise subchapter C, including the treatment of corporate acquisitions. A criticism of that proposal will appear imminently in The Tax Lawyer.
93. See ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 92, at 75-77; ALl Study, supra note 92,
at 20.

94.

ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 92, at 76; ALl Study, supra note 92, at 29.
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tive is to treat only those stockholders whose consideration consists of
the required percentage of stock in the acquiring corporation as having
participated in a reorganization. The aggregate approach is prefereable
for its simplicity if nothing else.95 Depending on the terms of the offer
and the response to it, the ultimate mix of consideration a particular
stockholder will receive may be unknown when the consequences of a
proposed transaction must be represented to the stockholders. Telling
stockholders that the transaction will be tax-free to some, but not to
others, adds incremental confusion for dubious benefit. Furthermore,
an individual stockholder approach would mark a radical departure
from the present treatment of a reorganization as a unitary concept.
A separate but related aspect of the required level of continuity
concerns the degree of control of the target company which the acquiring company must possess. This figure need not necessarily be the
same as the percentage of consideration which the acquiring corporation's stock must comprise. One proposal mirrors section 368(c) and
calls for eighty percent control by the acquiring company while requiring only sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the consideration to be
stock in the acquiring corporation. 9 6 In view of the policy of tax deferral only to stockholders of the acquired corporation where their investment does not undergo a significant change, the eighty percent
requirement should not be reduced. Regardless of the mix of consideration stockholders of the acquired corporation receive, it is difficult to
say their interests have changed only in form, or that the business enterprise has continued, where the acquiring corporation does not possess that degree of control which for various purposes the Code treats
97
as a rough equivalent of identity.
If some amount of boot is permitted in B reorganizations, it should
be taxed in the same manner as in other acquisitive reorganizations.
Section 356 taxes the receipt of boot either as gain (usually capital gain)
or as a dividend (if it has that effect), but only to the extent of the
amount of gain inherent in the disposed stock. The provision has been
criticized, justifiably, for thus limiting the taxable portion of what in
98
effect are often dividends.
The treatment of creeping B reorganizations needs considerable
95.

The ALIStudy, supra note 92, at 29, adopts an aggregate approach. Contra,ADVI-

SORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 92, at 78.
96. ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 92, at 76.

97. See generally I.R.C. §§ 332, 351, 1504.
98. ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 92, at 66-67; AL! Study, supra note 91, at
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clarification. Before 1954 they were not permitted. 9 9 Committee reports on the 1954 amendments evince a clear intent to allow creeping
stock acquisitions but do not state a policy for the change. 0 0 Presumably, the policy was to facilitate simplification of corporate structure
through a tax-free exchange of stock in a parent corporation for stock
in a partially owned subsidiary.' 0 ' Yet this notion was not limited to
situations in which the parent wants to eliminate an outstanding minority interest. For example, the Senate report sanctioned the acquisition
of sixty percent of the stock in a subsidiary in which the acquiring cor02
poration had purchased a thirty percent interest sixteen years before. 1
Granting reorganization status to an exchange that results in the
acquiring corporation either acquiring or increasing its control may undermine continuity-of-interest principles. For example, if Corporation
A already owns sixty percent of the stock in Corporation B and acquires the remaining forty percent in exchange for its stock, the adequacy of continuity depends on when and how the sixty percent was
acquired. If the acquisition were a sufficiently long time ago, continuity is acceptable regardless of how the block was acquired, because
at the time of the exchange Corporation A has supplanted the previous
owners of the sixty-percent block. If, however, the block were acquired
shortly before the exchange, the degree of continuity depends on the
form of consideration paid by Corporation A to acquire the block. If
the consideration is stock, continuity arguably is one hundred percent,
but if cash were used continuity would be only forty percent because
insufficient time has lapsed to regard Corporation A as having supplanted the previous owners.
Such difficulties are thought to be resolved by the step transaction
doctrine; the purchase is ignored if, in the vernacular, it is "old and
cold." The step transaction approach is unpredictable, being greatly
dependent on how the arbiter of fact divines subjective intent. It
should give way to objective temporal criteria, 10 3 which could serve two
important functions: one, to establish a time frame in which the acquiring corporation must obtain control, and in which stock exchanges
must occur to be part of the reorganization and hence tax-free; and two,
See notes 46, 62 supra.
See H.R. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A132-33 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 273 (1954), reprintedin [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4793, 4911.
101. See ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 92, at 78.
102. This example became part of Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c) (1955).
103. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c) (1955) uses 12 months as a cutoff for stock exchanges included within the "acquisition" for purposes of I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B). In American Potash &
Chemical Corp. v. United States, 402 F.2d 1000 (Ct. Cl. 1968), the government argued that
99.
100.

12 months was merely a guidelines. For discussion, see note 36 supra.
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to mark a point before which cash purchases would be ignored for purposes of determining whether the required percentage of consideration
paid by the acquiring corporation consisted of its stock. The required
periods should be determinable by reference to an easily identifiable
event, such as the adoption of a formal statement or plan.' 0 4 In light of
the reality of hostile takeovers, execution of the document by the acquired corporation should not be mandatory. The acquired corporation is not an indispensable party; the exchange between its
stockholders and the acquiring corporation can proceed with or without the acquired corporation's blessing.
An objective approach to the contours of a creeping reorganization
can accommodate a reasonable compromise between policy and pragmatism and can do so with greater certainty than the present formula
provides. If adopted, the objective rules should preempt to the greatest
extent possible application of doctrinal concepts such as continuity-ofinterest and step transactions.
Current reorganization definitions do not place limits on the relative size of the acquiring and acquired corporations. 0 5 Whales can
swallow minnows and vice versa. Continuity-of-interest is diluted to
some extent in any acquisitive reorganization; the "mere change in
form" rubric is never absolutely true. The business of the acquired corporation is blended with that of the acquiring corporation and control
over the business is henceforth shared. Where the imbalance disproportionately favors the acquiring corporation, as where a large conglomerate takes over a small company, the dilution can be so extreme
as to call the basic policy of tax deferral into question. Exchanging
control of a small company for an infinitesimal share of a company
whose stock is publicly traded is little different from selling out for
cash. Deferral of tax until the stock is sold, regardless of its liquidity, is
acceptable, but in the interim one must strain to find continuity in any
but a highly technical sense. In addition to questions of tax policy, taxfree treatment of such an acquisition also conflicts with some current
views of desirable antitrust policy. Some limit probably should be
placed on the relative size of companies participating in reorganizations, with adequate safeguards to prevent circumvention of the limit
through reversing the identity of the acquiring and acquired corporations. Such a provision, however, would disqualify small companies as
tax-free takeover candidates in most situations, depriving their owners
of the opportunity to "sell out" on a tax-free basis. Why they should be
104. Cf I.R.C. § 337 (adoption of a plan).
105. See ALI Study, supra note 91, at 24, 28.
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treated differently from a multitude of stockholders of a larger acquired
company whose individual continuity of control over their investments
following a merger may be far less is a legitimate inquiry, one which
goes to the treatment of a reorganization as a unitary concept.
Perhaps, then, Congress should consider radical surgery on the reorganization provisions, treating each stockholder's exchange on an individual basis. If such a system looked not only to the type of
consideration received, 10 6 however, but also to individual continuity of
control (as opposed to continuity of mere ownership), it would make a
tax-free exchange the exclusive right of substantial stockholders in relatively large target companies, for only they would have sufficient ownership in a merged entity to claim anything close to ongoing control.
Refinements obviously could be devised to alleviate concerns of this
nature, but is not the more basic question, to which this discussion
seems inexorably headed, exactly why reorganizations should be taxfree in the first place? Continuity-of-interest is a multi-faceted, elusive
concept, which in the context of reorganizations seems harder to grasp
the more one analyzes it. Yet it looms as the major justification of the
reorganization provisions. These final thoughts are not intended to
close in confusion, but rather to illustrate the need for a statute with a
more articulate link to its underlying policy.

106.

See text accompanying note 95 supra.

